1		HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
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9 10 11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE	
12 13 14	DEBORAH H. BEATON, Plaintiff, v.	CASE NO. C11-872RAJ ORDER
15 16 17	JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., et al., Defendants.	
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19	The court has received Plaintiff's renewed motion for temporary restraining order	
20	("TRO") (Dkt. # 8). The court previously denied Plaintiff's motion for TRO on two	
21	grounds: (1) deficiencies in the record as to whether any Defendant had notice of the	
22	lawsuit or the TRO motion, and (2) deficiencies in the record as to whether Plaintiff was	
23	likely to prevail on her claims against Defenda	ints. See Order (Dkt. # 7). Plaintiff has
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now represented that she has served relevant documents on the registered agent¹ for Defendant Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. ("NTS"), who is apparently scheduled to conduct a trustee's sale of Plaintiff's home on June 3, 2011. *See* Am. Certificate (Dkt. # 12).

Plaintiff acknowledges that in August 2006, a deed of trust was recorded on her home with Washington Mutual Bank, FA ("WaMu") as the beneficiary. *See* Complaint (Dkt. # 1), Ex. B. It appears from the documents submitted by Plaintiff along with her Complaint that the current beneficiary is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank NA ("Chase"), as successor in interest to WaMu. *See* Complaint, Ex. D. Those documents also state that Plaintiff is in default of the deed of trust for failing to pay \$15,320.28 owed. *See id*. As a result, Plaintiff has been notified that a trustee's sale of her home will occur, as conducted by NTS.²

Plaintiff wishes to, *inter alia*, restrain the trustee's sale. She has sued Chase and NTS, proceeding *pro se*. Her complaint requests declaratory relief "to determine [] whether Defendants have any legal or equitable rights in the Note or Deed of Trust, as to whether the Trustee's Deed is invalid and void, and whether Defendants have any legal standing to title or possession." Complaint ¶ 24. She also seeks a determination of whether Chase properly executed or recorded all endorsements and assignments of the beneficial interest in the promissory note and deed of trust. *See* Complaint ¶ 25. She also requests restraint of the trustee's sale to avoid irreparable harm. *See* Complaint ¶¶ 29-30.

¹ Plaintiff identifies the registered agent as Jeff Stenman, and claims that an unidentified, illegible signature on a copy of a summons is Mr. Stenman's signature. *See* Am. Certificate (Dkt. # 12) at 1, 4.

² Though Plaintiff contends the trustee's sale is set for June 3, 2011, the only notice of trustee's sale in the record indicates that the sale was scheduled for March 18, 2011. *See* Complaint, Ex. D. The court's review of the King County Recorder's Office web site reveals no subsequent notices rescheduling the sale to June 3 or any other date.

Plaintiff subsequently filed motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. *See* Pltf.'s Mots. (Dkt. ## 8, 9).

The court is now satisfied for purposes of resolving this emergency motion that there is some evidence in the record that NTS has received notice of this motion and the lawsuit. Plaintiff has not, however, amended her allegations to show this court that she is likely to prevail on her claims against the Defendants. Preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate if the plaintiff establishes "that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." *Winter v. Natural Res. Def.* Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).

Her renewed motion contains precisely the same factual deficiencies identified in her first motion, with no additional documentation showing that Plaintiff's claims have merit. Plaintiff again argues that the trustee's sale is improper because her alleged default is "in dispute and unproven," and because the Defendants have not produced documentation of a valid loan obligation. As to the first basis, the only documents in the record establish that Plaintiff is in default (see Complaint, Exs. D & F). As to the second basis, Plaintiff has attached to her complaint a letter from Chase dated April 5, 2011, which states that it is enclosing, *inter alia*, a copy of the note and security interest. *See* Complaint, Ex. F. Plaintiff did not attach those enclosures to her complaint, though it appears she has copies of the documents that could resolve this issue.

The only basis to find that Plaintiff has shown a possibility of success on the merits of her claims against the Defendant would be to credit Plaintiff's conclusory allegations in her Complaint and motion, which appear to be inconsistent with the only documents she has submitted in this suit. The court cannot find that Plaintiff's unsupported allegations amount to a showing of a likelihood that she will prevail on the merits of her claims. Thus, the court will again DENY Plaintiff's TRO motion (Dkt. #8). Dated this 2nd day of June, 2011. Richard A Jane The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge